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Abstract
In this article we present a model with two levels of skills and two classes of goods, one
produced with a technology requiring high skills, the other produced with a technology that
can be operated by both low and high skilled workers. In this model skill biased technical
change causes a drop in the demand for low skilled workers. The model, however, generates
two distinct labour market regimes. In one regime we show skill biased technical change
causes wage divergence between skilled and unskilled workers. In the alternative regime a
reallocation of labour prevents such wage responses. Introducing labour market institutions
through a bargaining process endogenises labour supply. This leads to three possible labour
market regimes and shows that skill biased technical change always causes wage divergence
but wage responses are moderated by higher unemployment of low skilled workers.  
Keywords
Skill biased technological change, job competition, wage divergence, low-skilled
unemployment.
The UK is the best documented example but wage developments in Australia, New Zealand, Canada show1
similar trends. These countries are referred to as Anglo-Saxon countries.
1
1. Introduction
Over the past decade or so, the labour market perspectives for low skilled workers have
worsened dramatically throughout the OECD. This problem has been widely recognised and
most authors agree that the causes for this deterioration of labour market perspectives are to
be found in the changing composition of labour demand. The OECD (1994) formulated the
problem as:
  .... one of the most serious current challenges in the OECD area is the trend
shift in the composition of the demand for labour away from unskilled and
towards skilled labour.
Throughout the OECD, however, it is interesting to note the different manifestations of this
seemingly common shift in demand. 
In Europe the shift in demand leads to a high and more asymmetric unemployment rate for
the low skilled and relative wages hardly adjust. Unemployment is high and rising relatively
for low-skilled workers in mainland Europe (OECD (1994), Draper and Manders (1997)) as is
the duration of their average unemployment spell (Muysken en Ter Weel (1997)). At the same
time we find skilled workers in Europe in jobs that do not require their level of skill, the so
called skill mismatch. This mismatch has been on the retreat over recent years (CBS (1996))
but low skilled workers do not replace relocating high skilled workers, indicating low skilled
jobs do disappear. 
In the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries , on the contrary, the most dramatic1
manifestation of the shifting demand is through relative wages. In these countries they show a
very strong tendency to diverge (OECD (1994)). Overall unemployment, in contrast to
mainland Europe, is at an all time low even though low skilled workers still suffer a much
higher unemployment rate relative to their high skilled competitors. Table 1 summarizes the
stylized facts described above that form the starting point for our analysis.
Table 1: Stylized Facts
Stylized Facts
OECD
Low Skilled Labour Demand Strong Decline
Mainland Europe US/UK
Relative Wages Stable Strong Divergence
Skill Mismatch Positive and Decreasing Insignificant
Unemployment Rates High Low
Relative Unemployment Rates Low and Rising High and Stable
2For explaining these stylized facts we pose two questions. First of all one has to explain what
may have caused the demand for low skilled labour to drop so sharply over the eighties
throughout the developed world. One would expect to find a common cause, since this drop
can be observed in so many countries over the same period. But then the second question
immediately follows. How do we explain so wide a range of different responses to this
common cause ?
In this paper we will address these issues by presenting a model that shows how biased
technical change causes the relative demand for low skilled workers to fall, but also allows for
two distinct labour market regimes that determine the response to this drop in relative
demand. We show that the decline in demand can cause either strong wage divergence or it
causes a chimney effect where high skilled workers are reallocated from low to high skilled
jobs, but relative wages remain stable. By introducing wage bargaining we allow for a more
sophisticated analysis of the response to common technology shocks. The extended model
yields three regimes in which wage divergence is a common feature but it can be traded off
against higher and diverging unemployment rates.  
Theoretical Background 
Two possible reasons for the drop in the demand for low skilled workers have been suggested
in the literature. On the one hand there are those that link the shift in demand to shifts in the
sectoral composition of the economy and link these shifts to the process of globalization and
increasing trade with low wage/low skilled countries. Key references are Leamer (1994,1995),
Burtless (1994) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). On the other hand there are those that
link this demand shift to pervasive changes in production technology often linked to the IT-
revolution. Some notable references are Krugman (1995a), Jackman (1995), Howell (1995)
and Agenor and Aizenman (1996). The issue remains to be resolved both in theoretical and
empirical work on either approach. 
From the research available so far we cannot safely disregard either hypothesis and both
will probably explain current events in the OECD partially. However, in this paper we
concentrate on linking technological change to labour demand in a way that allows us to show
a possible source of bias in technical change that may cause the shift in demand. The reason
for our choice of focus in addressing this issue is threefold. 
First we simply find the idea of biases in technical change intuitively appealing. It seems
evident from casual observation that different forms of technical change involve a particular
change in the organisation of the productive process. Introducing a new product usually
requires the set up of a whole new production line, which requires a skilled labour force that is
capable of dealing with the unforseen problems that occur during this phase of introduction
and commercialisation of the new product. As the product matures, the firm can develop and
introduce an interface that allows less skilled persons to perform the routine elements in the
production process and makes the skilled workers more productive.
Secondly the OECD (1994) presents evidence that the importance of trade in explaining the
changes in employment are but a fraction of the impact of productivity changes throughout the
OECD. In addition Schimmelpfennig (1998), despite his aim to restore the sectoral shift
hypothesis, only explains up to 40% of the change in employment patterns for Germany and
Schimelpfennig reclassifies his data in such a way that much of what we would consider technical change2
shows up as sectoral shifts. He considers the new occupations that emerge and require high skilled workers
as a symptom of sectoral shifts. Traditional classifications reduce the explanatory power of the sectoral shift
hypothesis to less than a third. Schimmelpfennig (1998) provides a brief summary of the empirical literature
on this issue.
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attributes the remaining 60% to skill biased technical change.  It thus has a profound impact2
on labour demand in general. Furthermore the relative size of intra OECD trade to trade with
non-OECD countries seems to rule out a severe impact of wage competition from low wage
countries at the aggregate level. 
A final indication for the relative importance of the technical bias hypothesis comes from
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) who show there is also evidence of wage divergence in
developing countries, which clearly contrasts with the traditional factor price equilisation
theorem. Although circumstantial this evidence supports our intuition and justifies our choice
of focus.
On the issue of different responses, notably between mainland Europe and the US, a booming
literature has developed over the last few years. Many authors have, and justly so, looked at
the differences in wage formation and labour market institutions for an explanation (Teulings
and Hartog (1998), Davis (1998), Krugman (1995b))  and indeed found that many of the
differences in labour market performance can be explained. 
Krugman (1995b) was the first to address the issue and in his paper he argues Europe’s
labour market rigidities imply an adjustment to the shifting demand in unemployment,
whereas the flexible labour markets in the US translate this drop in demand into a decline in
relative (and even absolute) wages: “Moneyless America, Jobless Europe”. Appealing as this
story seems, however, it does not explain the facts.
Nickell and Bell (1995) have shown European high unemployment is not explained by a
drop in low skilled labour demand. Furthermore data from the OECD (1994) show high
absolute unemployment rates but these are not as skill biased as those in the United States as
Krugman’s analysis would predict. Davis (1998) concludes he can explain the stylized facts
above in a model where Europe has a rigid minimum wage and European low skilled
unemployment essentially adjusts to equalize traded goods prices. Localized technical change
would yield the strongest conclusions but in our view contrast to the similarity in production
techniques used in the US and Europe. Furthermore we feel trade in goods cannot explain the
economy wide fall in demand that also manifests itself strongly in non traded services. 
In this paper we therefore set out to develop a model that provides an alternative and
perhaps complementary explanation for the observed differences in labour market responses.
This model allows for different labour market regimes that correspond to the stylized facts
independent of labour market institutions. Introducing differences in labour market
institutions then strengthens our conclusions.  
Outline 
Section 2 introduces the model in which we assume two levels of skill and two classes of
goods, one produced with a highly sophisticated technology requiring high skills, the other
produced with a relatively simple technology that can be operated by both low and high
skilled workers. Thus an asymmetry in employment opportunities is assumed. 
This setup is reminiscent of Krugman’s (1979) model of North-South Trade. The product cycle is simplified3
to two stages of production.
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Technical change can be introduced in the model by allowing the number of either class of
goods to increase over time. The development of new products, labelled product innovation,
causes the number of goods produced with high sophisticated technologies to increase. The
assumption is that producing a new good requires higher flexibility, higher problem solving
capabilities and more creativity: in short, higher skills on behalf of the worker. 
An expansion of the range of goods that can be produced with low skilled labour is labelled
process innovation. One could think of technical change as an improvement in the interface
between production technology and the worker, thus allowing a low skilled worker to perform
complicated tasks, previously only manageable by high skilled workers. Not only does the
interface allow low skilled workers to become productive, it also allows the high skilled
workers to be more productive than before. New goods thus mature as their interface develops
over time.  Using this framework we show two possible labour market regimes can result. In3
both skill biased technical change will cause a drop in the relative demand for low skilled
workers. 
Section 3 proceeds by analysing the response to skill biased technical change under both
labour market regimes. In one regime high skilled workers are employed in the production of
both classes of goods. It is labelled incomplete specialisation. Under this regime the drop in
demand has no impact on relative wages, but causes a reallocation of labour, a reduction of
skill mismatch if you will,  instead. Under the alternative regime of full specialisation we
show  technical change can be the prime cause of wages diverging between skilled and
unskilled workers. 
Section 4 introduces wage bargaining into the model. Here we show that wage divergence
can be “traded off” against increasing relative unemployment of low skilled workers under the
full specialisation regime. This situation broadly corresponds to empirical evidence on wage-
and unemployment developments in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, the incomplete
specialisation regime breaks up in two sub-regimes when bargaining is introduced. Under
these sub-regimes wages do diverge due to technical change even though there is incomplete
specialisation. For very low relative wages we find a regime of full employment for both skill
types. A more likely regime of relatively stable asymmetric unemployment can also occur and
is consistent with the evidence on employment and wage patterns on mainland Europe.
Section 5 presents our conclusions.
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Here we deviate from Krugman (1979) who assumes a one-on-one technology.4
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2. The Drop in Relative Low Skilled Labour Demand 
General Settings
Our economy consists of two types of households. We have consumers that consume a range
of goods and derive utility thereof. The utility function was taken from Krugman (1979) and
has the well known “love of variety” characteristics. All consumers are assumed identical and
are represented by an individual that maximises his and therefore total utility by choosing the
appropriate levels of consumption for each good, subject to his budget constraint. 
The variety of goods is produced by a range of production units that can only be
distinguished on the basis of their technology determined input requirements. Some varieties
can only be produced by high skilled labour due to the sophistication of the production
process - the class of high-tech or new goods. Others are manufactured in a routine like
manner and can thus be produced by employing either high or low skilled workers- these
constitute the class of low-tech or mature goods.  Within a class of goods the goods are
perfectly symmetric both in terms of utility and production technology. There are no other
inputs apart from high and low skilled labour in our model. 
By assuming price taking behaviour on behalf of the consumer and monopolistic price
setting by producers we find all high-tech goods have the same price, as do all low-tech
goods, within their class.
The producers set prices given demand, wages and their production technology. By the
symmetry and diminishing returns assumed within classes their decision is reduced to
choosing an average output level for high and low-tech goods, where output per variety within
a class is the same.  In the following subsections we first analyse the consumer decision and4
the producers’ decisions in isolation. Then the goods market equilibrium can be derived. By
confronting the labour demand that is derived from profit maximization with exogenous
labour supply we can close the model and analyse the impact of skill biased technical change
in comparative statics.
The Consumer Decision
Consumers maximize their utility. Assume a representative consumer whose utility is given
by:
where c  is the consumption of good i and n is the number of varieties of goods produced and i
1/1- the elasticity of substitution between two varieties. When we distinguish between a
class of goods that can be produced using high skilled labour and one in which both types of
labour can be used, we may write this utility function also as:
cH
cL


PH
PL
1
	1
xL
[l e L] 0<<1
xH
[lHH] 0<<1
In a symmetric utility function consumers optimize by spreading consumption equally across all varieties that5
command the same price. Hence consumers consume the average amount of all varieties within each class
and c =(c +c +...+c )/n .H h1 h2 hnH H
>1. Some tentative evidence in Van Zon, Muysken and Meijers (1998) has shown this value is approxi-6
mately 1.25 in the Netherlands between high and medium and medium and low level skills. 
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(3)
(4)
(5)
where subscripts H(igh) and L(ow) indicate the level of sophistication of the technology used
to produce those goods and c  and c  are the average amounts of consumption of high andH L
low sophisticated goods, respectively.  Finally n  and n  indicate the number of varieties of5 H L
both goods. We maximise the utility function subject to the simple budget constraint, Y= PH
n c  + P  n  c , where Y is income and P and P  are the price levels for both classes ofH H L L L H   L
goods. Then relative average consumption of high and low-tech goods is a function of the
relative price:
The Producers and Goods Market Equilibrium
Each variety is produced in a situation of profit maximisation under imperfect competition on
the product markets (varieties are heterogenous by assumption) and perfect competition on the
labour market. Labour (measured in efficiency units) is the only factor of production
distinguished in the model. 
We identify two groups of producers. As was mentioned above, the output of a variety of
high sophisticated goods can only be produced by employing high skilled labour. High skilled
labour not employed by the high tech producers is available for the production of low
sophisticated goods as is the entire supply of low skilled labour. The output of any variety
exhibits diminishing returns in the relevant input. Due to the symmetry in production within a
class of products and the diminishing returns, the average output per variety is equal to the
output of any variety within that class. It can be written as a function of the labour input per
variety. Average output of a low sophisticated variety is given by:   
Where l = ( L + L )/n , is the average labour input on all n  low sophisticated varietieseL L HL L L
measured in efficiency units. L is the number of low skilled workers employed and L  is theL HL
number of high skilled workers on low sophisticated jobs. The latter workers are assumed to
be  times as efficient as low skilled workers.  For all n  highly sophisticated varieties output6 H
is also equal to average output:
Where l  = L /n  is the amount of high skilled labour employed in the production of eachHH HH H
%H
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(7)
(8)
(9)
Figure 1: Goods Market Equilibrium
high tech variety. Profits for both types of producers are given by: 
Where w  and w  are the wages paid to one efficiency unit of high and low skilled labourH L
respectively. Producers now set prices to maximise profits given the relative demand for their
product (3), the production function (4) and (5) and wages. Standard optimization yields the
profit maximizing relative average supply as a function of relative prices and wages:
Equating relative average supply (8) and demand (3) yields the relative prices as a function of
relative wages for which the goods markets clear:
Equation (9) describes the relative wage-price frontier for which the goods market is in
equilibrium. Figure 1 shows this frontier, labelled GME, is a concave line through the origin
in P,w-space, where P and w are the relative price and wage ratio respectively.
The Demand for Labour 
A similar approach can be followed to derive the relative
wage-price frontier for the labour market. Since labour is
the only factor of production in the model, it follows that
the supply of a certain type of good directly generates a
corresponding demand for the appropriate type of labour. 
L D H
L DL e
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nH
wH/PH
wL/PL
	1
1	
8
(10)
By substituting for output in (8) by (4) and (5), we can solve for the relative implied demand
for labour (in appropriately skilled efficiency units) as a function of the relative product wages
If we aggregate over all varieties we find the aggregate relative labour demand:
The Impact of Skill Biased Technical Change on Relative Labour Demand
Now we define technical change in our model as the expansion of either range of product
varieties. Increasing the total range of varieties, n, implies introducing new products into the
economy, which we label product innovation. Increasing the range of low-tech products, n ,L
requires the development of an interface that allows low skilled workers to perform the
previously high skilled jobs. Hence we label this type of innovation process innovation. 
Skill biased technical change can now be represented by allowing n  (=n-n ) /n  to rise.H L L
We immediately see from (10) that it will cause a drop in the relative demand for low skilled
labour, measured in efficiency units. The economy can respond to this shock in two ways, as
the next section will show. There we first close the model by specifying labour supply in order
to analyse these responses.
3. Regimes and Responses in the Labour Market
In this section we introduce exogenous labour supply to provide a benchmark case and analyse
the possible responses to biased technical change without allowing for different institutional
settings. First we specify the supply side of the labour market, then we close the model and
analyse the impact of biased technical change on the reduced form equations we obtain.
Inelastic Labour Supply and Equilibrium in the Labour Market
Total supply of high-skilled labour is L*   and of low-skilled labour is  L*  . However, as weH L
mentioned above high-skilled workers can also be employed on low-tech jobs. They will be
willing to do this when high-skilled jobs do not offer a wage in excess of that which a high
skilled individual earns on low-tech jobs, that is when w  w . Actually when  w  > w  allH L H L
high-skilled labour L*  will be supplied to high-tech jobs, whereas when  w  < w  all high-H H L
skilled labour will be supplied to low-tech jobs. Only when w = w  are high-skilled workersH  L
indifferent where to supply their labour, and supply of high skilled labour on low skilled jobs,
L , is indeterminate in the range  0 < L < L*  . HL HL H
L S HH
L SL e

 0 for wH
wL
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LLHL
for wH
wL

 
L S HH
L SL e


L H
L L
for wH
wL
> 
PH
PL

 0 for wH
wL
< 
PH
PL


wH
wL
(L H	LHL)/nH
(L LLHL)/nL
1	
for wH
wL

 
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As we have mentioned above, L  refers to the supply of high-skilled workers on low skilled jobs. It can be7 HL
shown from the first order conditions for low skilled producers that these workers will only be employed on
these jobs when relative wages match relative efficiency, that is L >0 can only occur when w /w =. It isHL H L
profitable to replace low skilled workers with high skilled workers on low skilled jobs as long as the latter
condition is a strict inequality (<). On the other hand, high skilled wages should always exceed or equal
those for low skilled jobs, that is w w . Otherwise all high-skilled workers will seek employment on lowH L
skilled jobs. Therefore an equilibrium with 0<L <L*  is only possible for w /w =. HL H H L
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(12)
As a consequence, relative supply in efficiency units can be written as follows:
Equating (10) and (11) yields the relative wage-price frontier for which the labour market is in
equilibrium:
It can be verified in equation (12) that producers will set relative prices proportional to
relative wages with a factor of proportion that depends on the relative availability of high
skilled workers and the relative size of the high skilled sector. 
The labour market equilibrium represented by equation (12) can be represented in w,P-
space as well - the Labour Market Equilibrium curve, LME, in Figure 2. For w  < w  itH L
coincides with the horizontal axis, whereas for w  > w  it traces out a linear upward slopingH L
line on which the labour market is in equilibrium. Finally, for w  = w  the curve is vertical.  H L 7
LHL
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the Labour Market
(13)
Figure 3: The Complete Specialisation Equilibrium
For the relative wage equal to , equation (12) can be solved to yield skill mismatch, L /L* ,HL H
as a function of relative prices only:
It can be verified in (13) this relationship is negative in relative prices. This is plausible since
as relative prices increase, the high-tech sector can increase profits by employing more high
skilled workers at the given relative wages and thus reduce mismatch. The left quadrant in
Figure 2 shows this relationship as a downward sloping curve with a positive intercept at the
relative price level where demand for high skilled labour at w /w  =  will equal total supply.H L
The Equilibrium with Inelastic Labour Supply
In order to determine the simultaneous equilibrium of our model Figures 3 and 4 combine the
goods and labour market equilibrium wage-price frontiers. As the GME is a concave line in
w,P- space and the LME is upward sloping and linear from w /w =  onwards, we know thereH L
is a unique point of intersection for w  > w . This is shown in Figure 3.H L
nH
nL
> 
1
1	 L

H
L L
From equation (9) one can see that incomplete specialisation is characterised by relative prices that exceed8
unity, i.e. high-tech goods are more expensive than low-tech goods. It is obvious that this also holds for
complete specialisation.
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Figure 4: The Incomplete Specialisation Equilibrium
(14)
In such an equilibrium the wages paid in the high skilled sector are too high for low tech
producers to benefit from their employment. This implies they will set L  = 0 and relativeHL
wages now adjust to bring about equilibrium. The economy would remain in a point such as B
and the left quadrant shows the employment rate of high skilled workers in the low tech sector
is 0. Hence we label this equilibrium complete specialisation.
Another possible equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4 and prevails when the GME-curve
intersects with the LME-curve below point A. In such an equilibrium low tech producers find
it attractive to employ high skilled workers. And in the process of competing for high skilled
workers they will drive up the relative wages until w = . The economy reaches an
equilibrium at point C, where the GME-curve intersects with w = . In such an equilibrium
there is positive skill mismatch L*  as can be seen from the left panel of Figure 4. We labelHL
this equilibrium incomplete specialisation.   8
It can be seen from equations (9) and (12), the GME-curve does not change when labour
supply or the number of varieties change, whereas the LME-curve does. That is, the LME-
curve rotates clockwise both when L */L * and n /n  decrease. This implies that when lowH L L H
skilled labour is abundant, the ratio of high wages relative to low wages will be high and no
high skilled labour will be employed on low tech jobs. It can easily be shown that complete
specialisation will occur when:
As one might expect, the tendency towards full specialisation will be reinforced by product
innovations that increase n . For such innovations increase the relative scarcity of high skilledH
labour. Process innovations can be shown to have exactly the opposite effects
The Response to Technical Change
We now turn to the issue of different responses to a common shock. As we observed skill
12
Figure 8: Three Scenario’s in Response to Product Innovation
biased technical change in the form of product innovations cause a drop in the relative
demand for low skilled labour in efficiency units. The response to such a shock is determined
by the size of the shock and the regime we assume the economy to be in at the time of the
shock. In the beginning of the 80s there was, as we stated in the introduction, a positive level
of skill mismatch, indicating a regime of incomplete specialisation. The economy would find
itself at the intersection of LME and GME in a point such as B. Under that regime our model
predicts an increase in n /n  , our representation of skill biased technical change, will cause aH L
reduction of skill mismatch and stable relative wages. This is illustrated in figure 8. As n /nH L
increases it can be verified in equation (12) that the LME will rotate clockwise around the
origin and point A moves down to A’. The relative wage stays at  and skill mismatch is
reduced from D to D’. Both correspond to the stylized facts we mentioned for Europe in table
1.
In the US and most Anglo-Saxon countries skill mismatch is a non-issue in the economic
literature so we concluded it is not a significant problem in these countries. This would imply
the Anglo-Saxon world was in or very close to a regime of complete specialisation in the early
80s and found itself at the intersection of LME’ or LME” and the GME-curve. Under that
regime our model predicts skill mismatch will fall to zero and any further increase in n /nH L
will cause strong wage divergence as we observed has occurred in these parts of the OECD. 
To explain the stylized facts regarding relative and absolute unemployment rates we
obviously have to extend the model and allow for labour supply to respond to changes in
wages.
wH
wHL
1	uHH
1	u 
5
0<5<1 >1 wHwHL
In Annex A we present the derivation of such a bargaining process that yields results very similar to those9
arrived at here.
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(15)
4. Wage Formation and Unemployment 
So far we have not allowed labour supply to respond to wage adjustments and have assumed
zero unemployment. Unemployment will now be introduced in the analysis by assuming
endogenous labour supply and repeating the analysis outlined above.
Wage Formation and Labour Market Equilibrium with Elastic Labour Supply
When we endogenise labour supply and allow for unemployment, the results will obviously
change, although not qualitatively. We will, for the purpose of this paper, abstract from
microeconomic foundations underlying our labour supply conditions. For now we refer the
reader to for example Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1994) and put the exact derivation of our
assumptions on the agenda for further research.
Here we assume a process of wage bargaining, both by high-skilled workers and by low-
skilled workers, taking each other’s wage as a reference, in the context of a right-to-manage
model.9
High skilled workers will negotiate a wage, w , for the high tech sector. They will takeH
demand for high skilled employment in that sector, L , into account and use as an outsideHH
option, the wage a high skilled worker can earn in the low tech sector, w = w  . TheHL L
difference between exogenous total high skilled labour supply, L *,  and the level ofH
employment in the high tech sector is labelled excess high skilled labour supply, L , whichsHL
will turn to the low skilled sector. We thus define L = L *-L . In the case that w  would besHL H HH H
below w  , all high skilled labour supply would turn to the low tech sector.L
We assume for simplicity that for high-skilled workers unemployment benefits are equal to
the wage that would have been earned when working in the low-skilled sector, minus benefits
from leisure. Therefore being unemployed is a similar threat in the bargaining process when
compared to mismatch.
The high skilled wages bargained in the high tech sector are given by:
where u =(L *-L )/L * is the mismatch rate of high skilled workers and u* is theHH H HH H
exogenous rate that high-skilled workers accept when their demands are met. The wage claim
is a positive function of the level of employment of high skilled workers on high skilled jobs,
expressing their willingness to accept lower wages when mismatch is reduced. Furthermore
high skilled workers are assumed to take a fixed mark up, >1, over their outside option as a
base wage. This mark up is required for example to cover costs of education. Finally, as we
mentioned above, when w  would be below w  , all high skilled labour supply would turn toH HL
the low tech sector.
Low skilled workers are assumed to take the productivity adjusted high skilled wage, w /,H
as their ultimate target and will bargain for a fraction, 1/ < 1, of that target. Since low-skilled
workers are concerned about the possibility of unemployment, the bargained low skilled wage
wL

1

wH

1	uL
1	u 
5
Actually equation (4) does not preclude that for other reasons employers prefer to employ high-skilled10
workers first. In that case we would have complete crowding out of low-skilled workers.
Taking the same parameters u*,  and 5 for both bargaining processes is just for convenience and does not11
alter the qualitative results. 
We assume therefore, since employers are indifferent between employing high or low skilled workers on low12
skilled jobs, that u = u = u . Alternatively one could assume u =0 which yields the complete bumpingL HL L HLe
down referred to in footnote 6.
We argued above that when w <  all high skilled workers would seek employment in the low-tech sector.13
For regime A to be relevant, we assume (1-u*)  > 1. Actually when w <  we have  L  = 0,  L  = L  and5 s s *HH HL H
L  = L . Since this can never be an equilibrium given the love-of-variety nature of the utility function, we dos *L L
not present this in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Various Labour Supply Conditions
is a positive function of the level of low skilled employment relative to the reference level.
Moreover, low-skilled workers should take excess high-skilled labour supply L  intosHL
account, when considering unemployment prospects. The reason is that employers are
indifferent between employing low- and high-skilled workers (in terms of efficiency units) on
low-skilled jobs - cf. equation (4) above.10
Hence the bargained low-skilled wage is determined by:11
where u  = (L *-L )/L * is the low skilled unemployment rate - which is equal to theL L L L
unemployment rate of effective labour supply on low-tech jobs  - and u* represents the12
exogenous reference unemployment rate that low skilled workers accept when their demands
are met. This equation expresses the trade off between additional unemployment and higher
relative wages low skilled workers are willing to make. 
Rewriting (15) and (16) into labour supply equations and confronting these with (10) yields a
labour market equilibrium curve as in the previous section. Annex B provides the interested
reader with the full mathematical derivation of this LME-curve. 
Since labour supply is constrained between 0 and the exogenously given quantities of
labour, L*  and L*  this LME-curve is kinked. Because the supply constraints become bindingH L
at particular relative wage rates for both L   and L  , three distinct situations exist in thes sHH L
labour market.  Figure 5 shows the implications for L , L  and L  in these situations.13 s s sHH HL L
In Annex B we also show  that the LME curve is increasing over its whole range. Moreover, the LME-curve14
is convex over the range A-B, but not including C. However, it is convex within the range C. Since the GME-
curve is concave over its whole range, multiple equilibria are excluded.
This is elaborated upon in Annex B 15
15
Figure 6:  Labour Market Equilibrium with Endogenous Supply
One sees that in regime A when the relative wage is low - i.e. the low-skilled wage is high - all
available low-skilled workers will supply labour. But high-skilled labour supply will be
restricted in order to push for higher relative wages. As a consequence high-skilled workers
will be underemployed. We label this regime full employment incomplete specialisation. On
the other hand in regime C the relative wage is high and hence the high-skilled wage is high.
In that case all available high-skilled workers will supply labour in the high tech sector. But
low-skilled labour supply will be restricted in order to push for lower relative wages - i.e.
higher low-skilled wages. Hence low-skilled unemployment will prevail here. This is the case
of unemployment complete specialisation. Finally in regime B the relative wage will be in an
intermediate range. Neither high-skilled nor low-skilled workers will be fully satisfied, hence
both types of labour will be partly unemployed and high skilled labour is partly mismatched.
We label this regime unemployment incomplete specialisation. 
Whereas the LME-curve was a straight line in the case of full employment, it now is an
upward sloping convex curve, as illustrated in Figure 6. Again we refer the reader to the annex
for the mathematical derivation of this result. Moreover, because we have dropped the
assumption of indifference with regard to job type on behalf of the workers, w  is no longerHL
necessarily equal to w  .This also explains the convexity of the LME-curve.H 14
Finally, due to the different regimes elaborated in Figure 5, the curve has some breakpoints
that are marked by dashed lines.  For comparison we have added the full employment LME15
(labelled LME ).(F)
It is interesting to note the difference that results from wage bargaining. As we discussed
using equation (11), in full-employment at a wage of  w = w  high-skilled workers areH  L
indifferent between supplying labour to the high-tech and the low-tech sectors. Therefore
essentially, the allocation of employment is determined on the goods market in that case, that
is by relative prices for goods - compare Figure 4. However, from equation (14) one sees that
in the case of wage bargaining, the wage w = w  requires a specific level of high skilledH  L
supply L  = (1/) (1-u*)L*  . Hence in the context of wage bargaining, supply is no longerS 1/5HH H
undetermined. As a consequence the LME curve no longer is vertical at w = w  . At thatH  L
relative wage the relative price P() can be found by substituting w = w  in the LME-curve.H  L
The assumption necessary for this to hold is derived in Annex B.16
To keep the graph simple we have varied only the GME-curve. Strictly speaking this also implies a different17
LME-curve of the same shape since the GME depends only parameters  and , which also have an impact
on the shape of the LME-curve. An alternative way of showing the intersection may lie in each section would
be to rotate the LME-curve clockwise to reflect different n /n , an exogenous variable that affects the LME-H L
curve only.
If we set u*=0 this interval reduces to a point and thus drops out. Of course so does the corresponding18
regime. 
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Figure 7: Possible Equilibria under Bargaining
For any relative price below P() equilibrium is not possible. Therefore equilibrium will only
exist when the relative price resulting from the GME-curve at w = w  is at least P(). WeH  L
assume this to be the case.16
Equilibrium with Unemployment
In Figure 7 (a) we have combined Figures 1 and 6 to show the equilibria in the three
regimes.  When the intersection of GME and LME lies in interval (A) we have a full17
employment equilibrium with positive mismatch. In interval (B) we have unemployment of
low skilled workers and also for high skilled workers that seek employment on a low skilled
job.  In interval (C) we end up in a complete specialisation equilibrium with unemployment18
of low skilled workers only. Panel (b) in Figure 7 shows the unemployment rates in relation to
the relative wage, i.e. u  from (15) and u  (= u  u ) and the mismatch rate u  from (14). TheL H L HH HH
regime that prevails and it’s corresponding unemployment situation is a function of the
parameters of our model and therefore of the composition of our economy. From Figure 7 one
sees that wages diverge when the economy moves towards complete specialisation (C).
Beyond a particular critical wage rate (at which the full employment and bargaining LME-
curves intersect) the convexity of the LME-curve, however, ensures that wages do not diverge
as much under bargaining as in the model with exogenous labour supply - compare Figure 6.
Unemployment starts to acts as a buffer against wage divergence.   
Hence we may conclude unemployment rates can indeed be traded off against wage
inequality under this specification. It depends on the parameters of the model where most of
17
the adjustment to equilibrium arises. In the next paragraphs we will turn to the comparative
statics of the extended model and analyse the possible labour market responses to exogenous
technical change under bargaining linking the predictions of our model to the stylized facts
regarding unemployment we have presented in the introduction..
Responses to Technical Change under Bargaining
To see how the model responds to biased technical change under the endogenous labour
supply specification, we can again start by analysing the impact of changes in n  /n  on theH L
shape and slope of the LME-curve. From equation (9) we already know the GME-curve does
not respond to changes in n . The impact of product and process innovations on the LME-H
curve is the same under all three regimes and also identical to the impact under exogenous
labour supply. It reduces the relative price level for which the labour market clears for each
relative wage rate. This can again be visualised by a clockwise rotation of the LME-curve
around the origin while maintaining all characteristics established in Annex B. The continuity
and positive slope are unaffected, but the slope becomes smaller for all relative wages as does
the convexity (n  /n  is in the first and second derivative of the LME with respect to wagesH L
with a negative power). Thus the LME-curve rotates and starting from any equilibrium we see
the relative wage rate must increase - compare Figure 7. A limited rotation of the LME does
not provoke a regime switch but still moves the equilibrium to the right and up, implying
wage divergence and a relative price increase. A larger rotation moves us from a regime of
full employment incomplete specialisation into a regime of unemployment incomplete
specialisation and relative unemployment rates start to diverge too. Rotating even further
implies we eventually end up in a regime of unemployment complete specialisation. Here the
relative unemployment rate for the low skilled is infinite and mismatch has disappeared.
Wages have also diverged. However, if we compare these results to those obtained under
exogenous labour supply we can conclude that wages have diverged less and unemployment is
higher - compare Figure 6. The lower divergence in wages stems from the fact that the LME is
now convex and since technical change affects the slope of the LME-curve in the same way as
under exogenous supply the rotation is equal for the same change in n . This implies the newH
intersection with the GME-line must lie more to the left than under exogenous supply. This
yields the intuitive result that, as in standard wage bargaining models, unemployment can be
traded off against wages. 
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5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
To conclude our analysis we return to the stylized facts in Table 1 and compare them to the
prediction our model is able to produce. We have introduced in this paper the notion that skill
biased technical change in the form of an increased relative rate of product innovation is the
common cause for the drop in relative low skilled labour demand throughout the OECD. Let
us now first shortly summarize all possible responses our model can generate in Table 2. 
Table 2: The Impact of Biased Technical Change; An increase in n /nH L
Flexible Wages Bargaining
Initial Regime n
Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete 
Specialisation Specialisation Specialisation Specialisatio
Full Full Un- Un-
Employment Employment employment employment
(A) (B) (C)
w /w (0) (+++) (++) (+) (++)H L
u (---) (0) (-) (--) (0)HH
u n.a. n.a. (0) (?) (0)H
u n.a. n.a. (0) (++) (+)L
u /u n.a. n.a. (0) (++) (+)H L
Our bargained wages model is best equipped to address the issue of different responses to a
common biased technology shock, since it allows us to address both unemployment and wage
developments. It distinguishes three possible equilibria. Under the incomplete specialisation
regimes we see positive skill mismatch that is reduced when product innovations are
introduced. Relative wages diverge and relative unemployment, if positive, does so to. If we
assume bargaining power to be high, the trade off between asymmetric unemployment and
wage inequality causes a higher overall level of unemployment and a larger part of the
adjustment to biased technical change falls on unemployment. 
We also see that the reduction in mismatch may be accompanied by a positive and rising or
declining unemployment rate for the high skilled in interval B, which is wider for larger
“acceptable” unemployment rates u*. 
This corresponds nicely with stylized facts in mainland Europe, where skill mismatch
seems to be on the retreat and relative wages do not show strong divergence, but on the other
hand we see high and persistent unemployment particularly for low skilled workers and
relative unemployment rates show strong divergence over the past decade. 
A possible explanation for the fact that Europe is in a regime of unemployment incomplete
specialisation (B) is the high minimum wages for low skilled labour and the policies to
moderate high skilled wages. Although not explicitly analysed in this paper, such policies
would push high skilled workers into the low skilled jobs. Our model does predict, however,
that this stability of relative wages and unemployment will not last as the skill intensive high-
tech sector expands.
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Under complete specialisation our model predicts that increases in the range of skill
intensive goods will cause wage divergence and moderate divergence of unemployment rates.
Mismatch is absent in this regime. This situation applies to the United States, the United
Kingdom and most countries in the British Commonwealth. In these countries mismatch is
apparently not considered a big problem since hardly any attention is devoted to it in
economic literature. Wage divergence and real wage decreases for low skilled workers,
however, are deemed all the more important and Nickell and Bell (1995) show biases in
labour demand account for a large part of the asymmetry in unemployment in these countries
counter to what Krugman’s analysis would predict. Assuming, as would seem reasonable, that
labour markets are more flexible in the Anglo-Saxon world only strengthens our results. 
Under complete specialisation wage divergence for any given expansion of the skill
intensive sector yields higher wage divergence and lower unemployment rates for both skill
types. Our model would predict that as long as the knowledge intensive sector expands
relative to the rest of the economy these problems will become worse. 
It remains to be established, however, what drives the process of technological change.
Empirical research does not give a clear indication of whether the current problems are the
result of a transitional phase to a new steady state composition of the economy in which
relative wages, unemployment and mismatch again stabilize. These problems may also
indicate a new and lasting trend of deteriorating employment opportunities for the low skilled.
This makes further research into the process of technological change an important task.
In this paper we have presented a model that generates three possible equilibria. Using the
characteristics of these equilibria we can identify the regime of unemployment incomplete
specialisation with mainland Europe whereas the Anglo-Saxon world seems to be completely
specialised. This implies that both will respond differently to similar technological shocks
even under the same institutional settings. Allowing for differences in institutions brings us
even closer to the stylized facts of wage development and unemployment, we set out to
explain. 
A surge in the development of new products, that remains to be shown over the last
decades but can certainly not be dismissed beforehand, can explain wage divergence and
increasing asymmetries in unemployment in the Anglo-Saxon world whereas it also causes a
decrease in skill mismatch in mainland Europe. We do acknowledge there are many more
differences between and within these area’s of the OECD and do not intend to explain all of
the differences in labour market performance solely from this point of view. We do, however,
contend that biased technical change can be a common cause without leading to the same
effects. 
Furthermore our analysis sheds a different light on the policies implemented in the area’s
distinguished above. Relying on the so called chimney-effect to improve labour market
perspectives for low skilled workers in Europe will be self-defeating as complete
specialisation eventually is achieved. The undesirable side effects of such a regime are to be
considered in formulating such policies. Nevertheless it is desirable to use the chimney up to
the point where it stops working, since this increases welfare and wages for all workers. The
often advocated policies of wage moderation do improve the relative position of low skilled
workers but imply welfare losses due to inefficient allocation of skills.
As to the US policy of promoting technical change and R&D to create jobs for the
unskilled by boosting international competitiveness, this may actually backfire. Promoting
R&D in general may increase the development and introduction of new products and cause an
20
aggravation of the problem. Technology policy cannot, however, be evaluated without
introducing an explicit R&D sector into the model. We therefore put this at the top of our
research agenda. For now we suffice by concluding such R&D policies should be targeted in
order to deal with the problem of asymmetric unemployment and wage divergence.
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For simplicity we assume that unemployment benefits are equal to the wage that would have been earned19
when working, minus benefits from leisure. Therefore being unemployed is not a threat in the bargaining
process.
Equation (A3) can also be written as:20
which is very similar to (15).
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Annex A: A Labour Market Equilibrium with Bargaining 
The aim of this Annex is to present a wage formation process which is different from the
process presented in the text above, but none-the-less yields a LME-curve with similar
properties. This intends to illustrate the rather general nature of our analysis.
Assume that both high and low skilled wages are set by unions in a context of a right-to-
manage model That is, wages are set such that the utility of the union is maximized given the
implications for demand for labour- cf. equation (10).
The union that represents high skilled workers is assumed to desire the highest possible
wage for it’s members, but this wage must always exceed the low skilled wage by some factor
>1 to compensate for the costs of acquiring the higher skills. Hence w=w /w >, should holdH L
at all times.  Moreover, high skilled employment is valued with an intensity ! relative to19
wages and we assume, some minimum acceptable level of employment, defined as a share 
of the “natural”employment level (1-u*)L *. The union utility function is thus given by:H
The equilibrium demand for labour can be expressed as a function of relative wages by
combining (9) and (10), which yields:
The union is assumed to take the average employment level in the other sector, l ,  as given.Le
Hence maximising utility with respect to relative wages subject to the demand for labour in
equation (A2) yields:20
UL
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Taking the parameters u*,  and 5 for both bargaining processes is just for convenience and does not alter21
the qualitative results. 
However, the low-skilled workers ignore the potential presence of high-skilled workers on low skilled jobs.22
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(A4)
(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
Preferences for the union representing the low skilled workers similarly express a desire for a
highest possible wage, which must exceed their outside option, the unemployment benefit, w ,u
by at least a factor  to compensate them for the leisure lost.  Hence w -w  > 0 at all times.21 L u
Assuming unemployment benefits are a constant fraction  of low skilled wages, substituting
for unemployment benefits and multiplying and dividing by the high skilled wage yields the
excess of low skilled wages over their minimum acceptable wage as w (1-)w . Like in theH -1
case of the union for high skilled labour we assume the union for low skilled labour also cares
for employment.  Moreover we assume for simplicity employment enters the union utility22
function in the same way as for the high skilled workers union:
Again we find the equilibrium demand for labour from combining (9) and (10):
Since the low skilled union takes the level of high skilled wages and average high skilled
employment as exogenous, maximising the utility function with respect to relative wages
given labour demand yields:
Finally we assume that in equilibrium L =L +L  holds, hence employers in the low skilledLe L HL
sector are assumed to be indifferent between high or low skilled labour, measured in
efficiency units. Combining equations (A3) and (A6) yields the relative aggregate supply of
labour:
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(A8)
(A9)
Confronting this expression with the aggregate version of (10):
yields the LME-curve:
It can be shown that LME-curve essentially has the same properties as the LME-curve in (B5).
Both the first and second derivative with respect to w are positive under our parameter
restrictions, implying the LME-curve is upward sloping and convex in P,w-space as is shown
to hold as well for our LME-curve in Annex B. The analysis then can be pursued along the
text.
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Annex B: Derivation and Properties of the LME- curve with Endogenous Labour Supply
The wage equations (15) and (16) can be rewritten to give the following (kinked) labour
supply equations. For high-skilled labour we find from equation (15):
where the latter kink follows from the observation that supply cannot exceed L *. The firstH
kink follows from the observation above, that when w  would be below w  , all high skilledH HL
labour supply would turn to the low tech sector.
As we explained above, excess supply of high-skilled labour will spill over to the low-tech
sector, such that L  =L   - L   holds.  Thus we find:s * sHL H HH
In an analogous way we find the equation for low-skilled labour supply, although here we
should take effective labour supply into account. This implies:
Using the supply functions and the condition that all non-employed high skilled workers
supply their labour in the low skilled labour market we can derive for each case a relative
supply:
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These are the endogenous relative supply versions of equation (11). Confronting them with
total labour demand as in equation (10) we find the relation between relative prices and
relative wages for which the labour market is in equilibrium. The resulting LME-curve is
kinked at the relative wage rates for which either supply constraint becomes or ceases to be
binding. The general form for the LME-curve is: 
Conditions for the Existence of a Unique Equilibrium
For a unique equilibrium to exist we require the GME-curve to intersect the LME-curve at a
price level that exceeds P  (). P  () follows setting w /w =  in (B5) which yields:    LME LME H L
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Setting w /w = in the GME-curve (9) yields: P () =  . By assumingH L GME (-)/(1-)
P ()P () we can guarantee an equilibrium exists.GME LME
Properties of the LME-curve
Let  L  /L  = f(x), where x = (w/) , and w = w w  is the relative wage. This implies fors s e 1/5HH L H / L
cases A - C:
and:
respectively, compare equations (B4).
The LME-curve is given by 
where P represents relative prices and n = n  /n , is the relative size of the low tech class ofL H 
goods.
From equation (B4) it follows that the slope of the LME curve is given by:
which is positive whenever xf’(x)/f(x) > 0. We shall show this to be the case.
With respect to the second order derivative we find:
xA (x)
A(x) 

L L L

H
L L L

H 	 x 1	u
 L H
xB (x)
B(x) 
 1 
L L L

H
L L L

H 	 x 1	u
 L H
xC (x)
C(x) 
 1
d
dx
xf (x)
f(x) > 0
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(B13)
The LME-curve then is concave whenever . We shall show that this holds
too.
From equations (B7) - (B9) we can derive:
Combining equation (B13) with equation (B11) shows that the LME curve is increasing over
its whole range. Moreover, combining this equation with equation (B12) shows that the LME-
curve is convex within each range. Finally since  xB’(x)/B(x) > xA’(x)/A(x) > xC’(x)/C(x) the
LME-curve is convex over the range A-B, but not including C. However, since the GME-curve
is concave over its whole range, multiple equilibria are excluded.
